AML/KYC Working Group

Our aims…

 AML Blog…

October 2023 Update

• KYD ODD survey resulted in even split between 1,2,3 and 1,3,5. Feedback is CSSF didn’t challenge 1-3-5 during inspections.
• FATF Report
  • High level of compliance
  • overall framework for terrorist financing (TF) and proliferation financing (PF) TFS had some significant deficiencies, including gaps in the scope of freezing obligations, and lack of obligations to freeze without delay and without prior notification.
  • bolster its resources further to improve its ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute intricate money laundering cases.
• ALFI to simplify its Guidelines on Funds Assets. E.g. all UCITS are low risk; no need to perform a risk rating within UCITS according to geography etc.

June 2023 Update

• Fund assets risk scoring – Members discussed whether they were risk rating individual assets.  Most reported risk scoring at the asset class level, i.e. per risk categorisation of assets, as they do not have the ability to score individual assets; Some have a different process for UCITS than private assets.  It was suggested that firm should be risk assessing on a quarterly/semi-annual/annual basis.
• AML risk assessments – It was proposed that the WG draft a guidance paper on best practice to produce risk assessments. Sub-group to be established to work on this.

• Lux SMO regulations: ID / Verification and parent entity Following a recent question from a member around whether a subsidiary of a listed entity could be treated in the same as that of the listed entity itself, members discussed different approaches taken.  Some members will allow for the exemption to identify the beneficial owner where the customer is a direct subsidiary of the listed parent. Others will only permit if the customer is the listed entity.

• Definition of Persons Purporting to Act where it includes authorised signers including authorised signers of a regulated financial institutionA member raised a query around whether all firms were verifying the identity of authorised signers as persons purporting to act (PPTA) where those persons were employees of a regulated financial institution.  Some members confirmed they took a pragmatic approach and only requested the information where a screening alert was received.  Others source key demographic information upfront as they do not obtain ID documents – consideration as to whether we want to discuss with ALFI and/or CSSF.

• Russia: Distributor relationships, holdings and forced redemptions –  Discussion around whether any firms had taken any specific action around these relationships. E.g., compulsory redemptionSome members confirmed that they sourced the name of underlying client if there is a redemption via an intermediated relationship and screen themselves

• CSSF reviews on blocked accounts (update) – This is a known key focus for the CSSF with specific emphasis on distinguishing between accounts blocked where KYC documentation was incomplete/missing as against accounts blocked for other reasons e.g., dormant, sanctions, originals etc, Members discussed whether FATCA/CRS forms would be considered missing KYC.  In respect of dormant accounts, members discussed the importance of the TA distinguishing between dormant and inactive per the law of 2022.

• Onsite AML visits: Distributors and Branches – Members discussed current practice by firms around onsite visits.Branches – Monthly/quarterly meetings undertaken by most firms. External Auditors confirmed to a member that branches should be visited annually. Irrespective of whether a branch performs any KYC it was understood that the CSSF expects AML oversight.  Members discussed what that looked like e.g., access to AML P&P, anti-fraud controls etc. Distributors – Members discussed taking a risk-based approach to distributor onsite visits with some firms revisiting their practice post pandemic. Onsite visits appear to be limited and to high risk regions only.

• CSSF requirement to apply a 4-eyes principle when investigating false positive sanctions screening alerts The ILA notification was referred to.  This subject was also raised at an ALCO event end of last year.  Some firms have global models in place and are assessing 4 eyes review.  Some firms use a service provider and also review the alerts received

• France – Centralising TA Agent –  Members discussed the French centralising agent role and the challenges experienced in maintaining a Correspondent Relationship with the French centralising agent; Previously the TA obtained an AML letter; however, this is now being challenged as the centralising agent will no longer provide as a) it would breach French privacy rules and b) they could not guarantee that docs would be provided as they must request of securities clearing house.

• UBO declaration – Members discussed the circumstances where a beneficial ownership declaration is required with some members requesting for all clients and distributors; some do not request where there is no natural person, and the UBO/SMO information is provided via other documents.  Most firms do not require for counterparties.

• Luxembourg RBE (UBO register) – Members discussed the success rate in accessing RBE with mixed results.

• December 2022 Update – Much discussion on risk assessment requirements, framework, risk factors, and how to link in with risk appetite and resulting KPIs (for the Asset / Portfolio investments). Agreement to create a sub-group to hold workshops and draft an industry guidance paper in 2023.•It was noted that the CSSF expect all securities to be screened against PEP and adverse media lists, in addition to sanctions (although not stated in regulations or ALFI Guidance).•Recent CSSF publication on the results of thematic reviews it had conducted in 2021 focused on tax fraud, and the need to update the AML policy and work with the Tax team to create a joint risk assessment.

• September ’22 Update  If a PEP (acting as intermediary Board Member or UBO) doesn’t own the investment into the Fund or act on the account then the intermediary does not need to be considered a PEP account. However, some WG members will apply PEP status to the intermediary if a majority of the Board Members are PEPs. It was noted that that the CSSF expects full EDD applied to all individual and corporate PEPs even where the PEP risk is considered low or historical, i.e. the individual left their position of authority more than 12 months ago.

• Little regulatory guidance on transaction monitoring requirements. The Wolfsberg Group recently issued a Guidance which does not cover monitoring scenarios or thresholds but provides an extensive list of questions to be applied in the investigation process. The Guidance is aimed at correspondent banking but is also relevant for other payments-based relationships. Wolfsberg RFI Best Practice Guidance document_ Clean (wolfsberg-principles.com). The WG agreed the key is to have appropriate scenarios and thresholds and there is a risk if the net is too wide, and you have too many potential cases to effectively investigate and close out. The rules/thresholds should be tested by Audit for effectiveness.

• UBO register: The WG agreed this can be limited to EU countries, as per the fact the law is referenced according to articles of the EU directives.

• Signatory lists: It was concluded that only those who act on the account need to be screened.

• CSSF allows reliance on low risk regulated entities who screen their employees for screening. (Ref. CSSF 12-02/Art 33 ongoing screening concerning the client entity and UBO/SMO).

• EDD high risk countries: One should verify any relation to a high risk country; whether it be source of funds, UBO or other associated individuals and their level of ownership or control over the client, and assess the level of the associated risk on the client account. The TA may escalate any high-risk flags to the Mano.

• Please see below our comprehensive report in respect of the challenges facing Asset Managers in Luxembourg:-·

Download File